Is the Obama and EU Face-Off With Putin a New Cold War? What Forces Are Driving the Confrontation?

by Frank Thomas and John  Lawrence from the San Diego Free Press

Part 1

Some History (J. Lawrence)

Obama and Putin are locked in a dance reminiscent of the Cold War. But their maneuverings don't represent a Cold War not even a cool one. In fact it's more about placing themselves in the most noticeable positions on the world stage, something that each of their constituencies find familiar and even sentimental. Every world leader likes to lead the news, and Obama and Putin are no exceptions.

But first some history. Catherine the Great, one of the supposedly "enlightened despots" of Europe who hobnobbed with the French philosophes, nevertheless expanded the Russian Empire in a quest to attain a warm water port in the Crimea. Her armies fought a war with the Ottoman Empire (modern day Turkey) for control of the Black Sea. Peter the Great had opened Russia up to the Baltic Sea, founding St. Petersburg on the Baltic Coast, but Catherine was determined to expand her southeastern frontier and develop a permanent Russian presence on the Black Sea.

 

Turkish wars and three successive partitions of Poland during Catherine’s reign brought much of modern Ukraine under Russian rule after the region had spent centuries under Polish-Lithuanian control. Catherine’s victories enabled Russia to establish a Black Sea fleet. Special access to the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits that connected the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea via the Sea of Marmara became a key foreign policy goal for Catherine’s descendants during the 19th century, contributing to the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853-1856).

 

The Crimean War reinforced in Russia a long-felt sense of resentment against Europe. There was a feeling of betrayal that the West had sided with the Turks against Russia. It was the first time in history that a European alliance had fought on the side of a Muslim power against another Christian state in a major war.

 

Russia formally annexed the Crimea in 1783. Then in 1954 Khrushchev decided to give Crimea back to Ukraine. His great-granddaughter said of Khrushchev's motivation "it was somewhat symbolic, somewhat trying to reshuffle the centralized system and also, full disclosure, Nikita Khrushchev was very fond of Ukraine, so I think to some degree it was also a personal gesture toward his favorite republic. He was ethnically Russian, but he really felt great affinity with Ukraine." In other words, there would be some administrative adjustments but it was fully intended that Ukraine would remain within Russia's sphere of influence.

 

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Ukraine started lobbying to become a member of NATO. Russia did not take kindly to having nations on its borders become NATO members. And it's not hard to understand why. Suppose that communist Cuba had influenced Mexico to go communist and to ally itself with Russia. Suppose further that Russians had proposed putting missiles in Mexico on the border with the US. Would the US have stood for it? One only needs to look to history for the answer. The Cuban Missile Crisis almost provoked a nuclear war until the Russians took their missiles out of Cuba. Putting ourselves in Putin's shoes, he must see the introduction of American missiles into Ukraine, should Ukraine become part of NATO, to be a huge threat to the security and the dignity of the Russian Empire. The West would be essentially taking over land fought for by the Russian Czars for hundreds of years. And Putin is the logical descendant of the Czars and the Russian Empire. It would be a huge blow to his self-esteem.

 

Resurgence of Russian Conservative and Radical Forces in the Post-Soviet Era

(F. Thomas)

 

Russia since Yeltsin’s time has been struggling to find a new grand strategy – one that defines who Russians are and where they are going. Yeltsin called this the search for the “Russian Idea” (Russkaya ideya).

Well that Russian Idea has acquired substance from one of the most popular Russian ideologists who is providing theoretical guidance for such a new grand stategy. Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn in a recent Foreign Affairs article say Aleksandr Dugin is the “brain” behind creating a Eurasian Empire, unifying Russian-speaking territories, and resurrecting the imperialist posture of former Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia (see: “Putin’s Brain,” Foreign Affairs, 3-31-2014).

Aleksandr Dugin’s ideology has influenced a whole generation of conservative and radical activists, and politicians. Seeing the rising popularity of his ideas, Putin has been exploiting some of them to explain his own policies and goals following the appropriate historical, geopolitical, cultural party line.

Dugin’s conservative Eurasian ideology rejects liberal, democratic, and capitalistic “Atlanticism”  led by the US. The aim is creation of a Eurasian empire led by Russia to counteract aggression from North Atlantic interests. This conservative doctrine redefines Russian foreign and security policy and preconditions that must be met before Moscow will recognize the independence of post-Soviet states. As something new, it includes extralegal conditions to justify Russian policy and legitimate use of military force to defend Russian speaking communities abroad. Above all, it extols Russia as a unique civilization on its own that cannot be judged by Western standards.

Message? Russia is NOT Europe.  

As this Eurasian conservatism has grown in popularity, it has reignited Russian nationalist thought and pride. It has strong support from members of the security apparatus and military sectors with whom Dugin has had close ties. It is driven by a dedicated core of Russian ultranationalists – disturbed by the Russian state’s weakness since 1991 – whose goal is the restoration of Russia’s rightful glory and national sense of destiny. As one analyst notes, “After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a few hard-core patriotic elements remained that opposed de-Sovietization and believed – as Putin does today – that the collapse was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

US and European definitions of conservatism are light years apart from those of Russia. EU conservatives and particularly US conservatives are very wary of big government and put the individual first. Russian conservatives back state power and see individuals as serving the state. Russia’s Eurasian conservative strain reflects a long tradition of Russian imperial conservatism – a conservatism that is quintessentially authoritarian, anti-capitalist, anti-American and anti-European. It values submission of the public to the state and submission of individual needs to the needs of the many. It values tradition, religion and a state-organized economy (hence elements of communism). More significantly in these modern times, it is expansionist and part of the motivating ideology behind Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Putin has transitioned to just being another Czar in a long history of authoritarian czars who punished their own people for the good and glory of the nation and, of course, always for the good of the people themselves! Putin’s manic urge to regain Russian self-respect has descended into military, muscle-flexing manipulation tactics, ^e.g. to bring Crimea within its orbit – repeating Catherine the Great’s conquest and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 1783. At the same time, Putin’s support of pro-Russian separatists to destabilize Ukraine fits perfectly his design to undermine Ukraine’s bid to become a EU member. He wants Ukraine in the Eurasian Economic Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Part 2 (F. Thomas)

Part 1 can be found here.

Some Questions Raised

As Germany’s gifted Chancellor Angela Merkel said recently: “Putin lives in a different reality.”

Putin’s brain, Aleksandr Dugin (the author of Eurasianism) has reinvigorated Putin’s policy for expanding Russia’s sphere of influence to Russian-speaking communities in bordering nations. Dugin is an unsparing advocate of the Russian insurgents working near or within the Ukraine. Mervyn Bendle writes , “Under Dugin’s influence, fear of Atlanticism now pervades the Russian defense establishment and Putin. Recognizing the limitations of traditional military action, Dugin advocates a program of ideological warfare, subversion, disinformation, demoralization, destabilization, and insurgency, with special forces, sponsored militias, and other covert services in the vanguard.” (see: “The Imperialist Ideologue Driving Putin’s Brain,” The Australian, 7-23-2014)         

In National Review Online, Robert Zubrin concludes:          

“Dugin is the mad philosopher who is redesigning the brains of much of the Russian government and public, filling their minds with a new hate-ridden totalitarian ideology whose consequences can only be catastrophic in the extreme, not only for Russia, but for the entire human race.”

Does this mean Putin is a “wild imperialist bully” surrounded by ex-KGB hardliners on a mission to unify at any cost the community of Russian-speaking people centered around Russia. Is Russia an “axis of evil” as some hysterical accounts hammer out? Will Putin accept ‘carte blanche’ neo-Eurasianism as the legitimate ideology for his regime?  (see: “Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism,” February 27, 2014)

To answer these questions, one must first put oneself in Putin’s position – as disagreeably uncomfortable as that may be – and also set aside for a moment the media’s relentless demonization of his character and intentions.

He views the West as being in moral decline and grossly hypocritical. For him, Western democracy is an illusion maintained to conceal and distort colonization and invasion policies. Accordingly, he accuses the West and especially the US of employing a world policy of force, a neo-colonial approach of monstrous aggressions against country after country – Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, undercover operations in Syria and Venezuela, embracive anti-Russian containment policies, e.g., planting missile defense systems near Russia; making Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia ripe for NATO membership and thus further surrounding Russia with dangerous missiles; establishing a US NATO military outpost in Georgia; organizing and financing a Ukrainian regime change as a step to prevent Russia from achieving close integration and unity within the Eurasian Economic Union, etc. Is it any wonder, as one commentator remarked, Russian authorities feel that, “The country is confronted with existential danger.”

Only one country has a fighting force that spans the globe; only one country has a global police-spying network; only one country is sending killing-drones all over the world; only one country is relentless when it does not get its way … and that country is not Russia. This is how Putin’s ‘imperialistic’ mindset views the US’s ‘imperialistic’ mindset.   

In Putin’s eyes, this and much more is being done in violation of international laws to strengthen the West’s geopolitical position. The West has been and is now stepping up a policy of economic-political-societal containment of Russia. His response – “We must fight back.”    

These well-orchestrated Russian ‘part fact-mostly lie’ assertions and Putin’s extralegal argument that the referendum and subsequent annexation of Crimea reflect a legal right of communities within a state to “self-determination” is striking a very positive chord among the Russian people. Unfortunately, as I will elaborate later, international law apparently fails to restrict imperial territorial ambitions of leaders like Putin.

Putin’s view is that Russia’s military support to the pro-Russian separatists does not violate international law as the separatists are only defending themselves from the Kiev “fascists.” Yes, indeed, “Putin does live in a different reality” … but that reality has to be engaged in a constructive manner by Western leaders in my view.

As one analyst stated: “Russia is now claiming the right to use military force for the declared purpose of defending Russian-speaking people outside Russia and to act in line with Russia’s interests.”  The contradictions here get more profound  … when the fighting against the former Russian provinces began in Ukraine, the Doema gave Putin the power to use military force. But Putin asked the Doema to take this power back. He preferred a diplomatic solution, while doing everything possible indirectly to destabilize Ukraine. Despite the fact Russia thinks differently about geopolitics from the EU and US, it does not seek a military conflict with the West.   

In the face of western interference in the current Ukraine crisis, Putin has been invoking legal arguments based on the principle of “self-determination” to justify  Russia’s right to defend and guarantee the rights of ethnic Russian-speaking people anywhere it chooses in the Eurasian circle of nations – needless to say an extremely anachronistic outlook in this modern world of international law.

In Putin's words: “Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in the Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means.” (see: “The Putin Doctrine: The Formation of a Conceptional Framework for Russian Dominance in the post-Soviet Area,” by Marek Menkiszak, 03-27-2014)

Putin applies this declaration not just to the inhabitants and citizens of the Ukraine – considered a vital historic and civilization link for Russia – but also to the post-Soviet area as well. As stated earlier, Putin wants close ties with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in the Eurasian Economic Union – the Russian policy for preserving the identity of nations in the Eurasian space in a new world. As Putin has remarked, “We are one people … we have a common church, a common spiritual source, a common destiny.”

However, under such a formal customs union arrangement, bordering state neighbors like Kazakhstan are not about to sacrifice their sovereignty as free nations nor accept being bound by international agreements or pure Russian national interests they fundamentally disagree with.

Putin is more and more justifying his actions using extralegal arguments, ^i.e. “legal means” (or the appearance of legality) and/or questioning the legitimacy of things on legal grounds. In this regard, he’s been having a field day flaunting and manipulating one of the central values of international law – “self-determination.” He uses this concept to justify, for example, the Crimea secession based on the ‘special case’ legal precedent set by Kosovo’s secession from Serbia; to justify the use of military actions and/or support when he’s acting on behalf of the rights of the ethnic Russians of eastern (and perhaps southern) Ukraine.

Putin exploits the extreme vagueness of the term “self-determination.”  He gives it an entirely other meaning than that originally incorporated in the UN Charter. In the UN Charter, this basic tenet had the meaning that the principle of  “equal rights and self-determination”  refers to the political right to be free from outside domination or interference in a country’s sovereignty. “Political” self-determination was established to outlaw imperial ambitions – so prevalent in neo-colonial times. In other words, each country’s territorial integrity was to be respected. The crime completely contrary to self-determination was aggression – the taking of another country’s territory and population by force.

The problem is that the principle of self-determination has come to be amorphously defined in terms of  “identity,” ^i.e. ethics, or language or culture applicable to national or ethnic communities – notwithstanding whether those communities exist as sovereign states or not. Thus, helped by the 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, self-determination has come to mean two things: “political” self-determination and/or “identity-based” self-determination. This obscurity in meanings gives Putin an apparent (but questionable) extralegal opening to justify using military actions when acting on behalf of ethnic Russian minorities - like in eastern Ukraine - who have freely decided to be absorbed by Russia.  It’s like saying Texas can secede from the US and join Mexico (heaven forbid) without a national vote required or government say.

As Michael Blake, Prof. of Philosophy and Public Affairs at the University of Washington states: “Here is the problem: in many modern territorial conflicts, the two accounts of self-determination give us wildly different answers. For example, East Ukrainians feel marginalized in both political and ethnic equality. But members of these communities already have self-determination – they are equal citizens and have a reasonable chance of being heard in that country’s political bodies. Here, national identity is not directly relevant to self-determination – except for discrimination or injustice. But the principle of self-determination has come to mean two things – and this fact enables leaders like Putin to disguise their hypocrisy … ‘secession self-determination’ is a response to violations of the right to self-determination, rather than a right in itself.”

Thus, given the obscure meanings of self-determination, is it any surprise Putin exploits the identity meaning that all ethnic groups or national minorities can form their own states. Of course, this principle invoked as de facto international law hasn’t stopped Putin from unequivocally rejecting the self-determination rights of Chechnya.(see: “Putin Manipulates International Norms for Imperial Ambitions,” by Michael Blake, 07-24-2014)

Part 3

by Frank Thomas and John Lawrence

Parts 1 and 2 can be found here and here.

So Why is This Obama's Problem (J. Lawrence)

Without any cooperation from Congress, Obama is relegated to using his executive powers to try and effect some meaningful action on his domestic agenda for which the Congressional Republican response is, "Let's sue him." The Republican House not only will not cooperate with Obama on any level, they actively oppose his every move. They are worse than a "Do Nothing" Congress; they are an active  "Try to Make Obama Fail No Matter What He Does" Congress. The only legislation the Republicans in Congress would support is if Obama suddenly came to them and proposed a massive tax reduction for the rich and a concomitant tax increase on the poor and middle class. Or if he proposed to do away with Medicare and Social Security. Then they would line up in support of Obama and cheer him on.

Obama is tied down like Gulliver by the Lilliputians. Obama would like to do something about America's aging infrastructure, the latest example of the weakness of which was the recent breaking of a hundred year old water main in Los Angeles resulting in the spewing of 20 million gallons of water that destroyed the Pauley Pavillion and 400 cars. And all this in the middle of the worst drought the state had ever seen.

Where Obama does have some freedom of action is in foreign policy because, after all, he is Commander in Chief. He does not have to ask Congress' permission to get involved in that except they will criticize his every move in that domain as well. So in order not to be entirely irrelevant, the alternative is to strut the world stage and have a little face off with Vladimir Putin. That commands the world's attention and puts Obama in the spotlight. The Putin-Obama spectacle is a made for television duel at the highest level. Take that you sorry assed Republicans. Who's in command of the world situation and the media visibility now?

Of course the Europeans are not so agitated by Putin's maneuverings in his own back yard as if what happens in Ukraine is really that critical to the world's equilibrium. To his credit Obama is not proposing military action in Ukraine like some Republicans - if they had the chance - would do. He is taking a rather moderate level-headed approach as is his wont. But why is he concerned at all? What business is it of his? Whatever happens there does not affect US interests one bit. In fact, the best thing from the European and US point of view is that the situation becomes stabilized one way or the other so we can get on with business as usual. Business as usual is the outcome the Europeans want, and mostly they couldn't care less whether it's with a Ukraine that has been absorbed into Russia or with a stand alone Ukraine. Either way Ukraine is a basket case and will need outside help. Why not let that be Russia's can of worms? Does the US and the EU really want to be in the position of sending financial aid to Ukraine?

Instead Obama has proposed sanctions on Russia and now he is upping the ante - more sanctions. Sure this will hurt Russia, but it will also hurt Europe, America's ally, since they do far more business with Russia than the US does. Putin now has retaliated saying that Russia won't accept shipments of certain crops from the West. In other words, both sides are trying to hurt the other in terms of the normal peace time activity of trade. And both sides are shooting themselves and each other in the foot. Now Obama has even sent troops into Ukraine to train and equip its National Guard. Nice provocation.

What's in it for the US? Nothing, but it is a theater in which Obama can play a starring role remaking himself in the traditional American role of telling the rest of the world what they can and cannot do. If Obama had butted out of the situation, Republican hawks would have a field day calling him weak and ineffectual. They still are doing that because they will settle for nothing less than a military confrontation with Russia or at least another Cold War. Defense contractors are licking their chops.

Long story short: Obama, in order to command some attention on the world stage, needs to engage with his arch nemesis, Putin, to bring some drama to the White House and not to seem totally irrelevant - when being pinned down and forced into a corner by Congressional Republicans who are bolstered by hate talk radio busy whipping the American listening public up into a frenzy. It's mano a mano or superhero (Obama) vs superhero (Putin). Here Obama is playing with fire. Putin considers himself Obama's equal on the world stage and most likely doesn't appreciate being talked down to. The situation could easily escalate beyond sanctions.

Most likely though Obama's sanctions will come back to haunt him in the long run. Sure the American dollar is the world's reserve currency, and as such, not allowing Russia to settle accounts using the dollar, which is what sanctions amount to, puts Putin in a bit of a stranglehold. However, as a recent conference among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations has made clear, there is a movement afoot to establish another world currency. Obama's sanctions will only hasten the day when that becomes a reality and the dollar will no longer be able to dominate the world's currencies. At that time, sanctions will be meaningless. The BRICS have aspirations to challenge the dominance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

This is from Voice of America:

When news broke last month that the so-called "BRICS" nations - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - had agreed to form their own development bank, some analysts feared the new body would be little more than a political bloc. But others are welcoming the plan, saying the world needs help when it comes to development finance.

Leaders of the BRICS nations meeting in Brazil last month reached an important agreement: they would create a development bank to counter the West’s dominance in international finance.

Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff:

“The new BRICS development bank should have an initial authorized capital of $100 billion dollars. And an initial subscribed capital of $50 billion dollars equally distributed between its founding members, the five BRICS countries,” said Rousseff.

Some analysts worried - since international finance has long been the territory of established institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, founded and run by Western nations.

Perhaps western analysts will not be so sanguine when other nations, particularly Russia and China, will no longer need the US dollar in order to do business and settle accounts. At such time, Obama's sanctions will be moot, and the US dollar will have lost a good deal of its preeminence. What that portends for the American people is debatable, but nothing much good can come out of it.

Where Does All This Bring Us – What’s the Solution? (F. Thomas)

It’s obvious Russia has serious problems today as an authoritarian democracy with a weak economic system totally dependent on oil/gas reserves. Putin’s Kremlin has many repugnant policies (^e.g. Putin’s coddling of Belarus’ repulsive dictator), and the West has a few of its own (trying to place defense missiles near Russia’s border).  

The Western media has a short memory of how Putin has stabilized an economically disintegrating nuclear-armed country. Also he has probably saved Obama’s Presidency and the waste of US military lives by persuading Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to eliminate his chemical weapons. Putin then helped ease Obama’s contact with Iran. So Putin has done some good things for which he's not given much credit. It seems like some politicians are only too eager to reestablish him as some sort of cold war boogie man.

And then there’s the mindless EU ultimatum that in a profoundly divided Ukraine the democratically elected President must choose between Europe and Russia – completely numb to the reality that there are two Ukrainian peoples utterly divided as to whether to join Europe or to remain close politically and economically to Russia. Putin’s proposal for a three party arrangement was prematurely thrown out by US and EU officials.

As to the question of how to come out of this chaos, Sergij Karaganov, a top advisor to Putin in a recent interview with a Dutch newspaper listed four scenarios:

1. Russia gives itself over. That won’t happen.

2. Russian troops enter the Donbass (contested area of eastern Ukraine). That would be another Afghanistan.

3. Status quo. The fighting in Donbass continues. Ukraine collapses (it’s nearly bankrupt) and the manipulation goes back and forth.

4. Russia claims the Crimea as a victory for democracy by virtue of the vast majority of pro-Russian Crimeans who voted for rejoining Russia (note: Putin also believes Crimea’s incorporation into Ukraine was constitutionally illegal). Russia then slowly exits out of the Donbass, offers housing to those who, by their cultural cohesiveness and skills, have an enormous potential. Russia keeps the political pressure on Kiev.

His conclusion: Scenario 4 is the best; scenario 3 is the most likely scenario. In all scenarios, Ukraine will be considered victims (pawns) by the West as well as Russia. The Ukraine is doomed. It has failed as a state. 

My view is that Russia wants a failed Ukraine state so they can take it over.

A sensible and realistic, albeit not easy, strategic answer to the senseless breakdown among post-Soviet nations and East-West relations has been put forward by Stefan Meister. (see: “Rethinking the Eastern Neighborhood,” by Stefan Meister, 06-10-2014).

He recognizes that very serious sanctions, while probably not workable and mutually very costly, may be necessary if Putin continues to think further aggressive actions in the Ukraine or in other post-Soviet states or even towards Russia’s business elites – will not result in severe reactions. As he says, “Putin must understand that undermining a nation’s sovereignty, and perhaps its own economic stability, cannot stand without consequences from outside and/or inside.”  

Meister takes a more EU open engaging approach in creating a new security and economic order including, not isolating, Russia. His strategic policy recommendations include:

• The current crisis stems from fact that after the East-West crisis, Russia has never been integrated in a functional European security system. There’s a lack of instruments to diffuse conflicts. In the long run, Europe and Germany must develop a new conference on security cooperation that includes Russia and other post-Soviet countries. The OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) needs to play a more prominent role in European security policy. The NATO-Russia Council and EU-Russian Summit are both politicized and poorly suited for conflict resolution due to their exclusivity.

• Debates about a new security order need to be initiated now, and EU member states should be prepared to guide them. The EU lacks debates on urgent strategic issues which could bring Brussels away from reactive policies.

• Instead of legitimizing Putin’s system by continuing cooperation offers which undermine its own value system, German policy needs to realize that change won’t be   brought by post-Soviet elites but rather by society itself. Both Ukraine and other    states in the eastern neighborhood require further financial and political support. Thus, intensifying the dialogue with civil society and alternative economic and political elites should be a key European policy priority.

• There is more at stake than the sole resolution of the Ukraine crisis. Above all, it is acceptance of unstable post-Soviet states might once have been convenient, but now is a huge problem in such a crisis situation. Russia’s dominance in post-Soviet conflicts have strengthened its sphere of influence and the undermining of the sovereignty of these states.

• Well-intentioned considerations for Russia on historical grounds cannot be the correct response to negative developments in the Eastern neighborhood. The intensification of social exchanges is essential in tackling this issue. A first move should not only include the simplification of visa requirements for small, privileged groups, but for Russian and Ukrainian society as well. Moreover, EU membership perspectives have to remain an option for all those Eastern neighbors who show an interest to reform and integrate, be it in 20 or 30 years time. 

• Germany and Europe should resist importing Russian rules and informal decision- making structures by making compromises and instead confront these with their own fundamental universals values. Ultimately, the Ukraine crisis offers the chance to regain credibility and break wrong patterns of behavior. The longer we wait to act and invest, the higher the price will be.

Meister underplays Putin’s’s obsessive commitment to Eurasia – representing a “Russia that is not Europe, post-Soviet bordering nations that are economically integrated with Russia.” But I  agree the core problem is a total failure to create a sustainable model of the relationship between the EU and Russia – one suitable to both parties and only achievable through serious dialogue. There are valid concerns the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy will undermine Eurasion integration – leading to severe economic losses and social hardships for Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, etc.

As Putin’s advisor, Sergij Karaganov, has said, “We need an identity that will take into account the changing world world around us and at the same time is based on a realistic assessment of our strengths and weaknesses.” However, Putin’s own delusional imperial ideas that largely mirror Aleksandr Dugin’s ideas are nurturing an invigorated new generation of nationalistic conservatives and radical activists – making constructive engagement extremely difficult. I doubt Putin is comfortable about this rising extreme right development.                                       

It remains to be seen whether Putin can control the radical elements of Eurasianism and survive the exit of the money and investor classes if financial sanctions do prove very painful. Of course, a mutual sanctions war involving Russian gas supply blackmail and blockade of EU imports hurts Europe economically far more than the US.

Summary: (J. Lawrence)

Putin regards himself as following in a long line of Russian autocratic Czars including Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. He wants to reestablish the dignity and glory of Russia whose pride was diminished by the demise of the Soviet Union. He can't tolerate a NATO encroachment in his sphere of influence which could possibly place missiles on his doorstep, jeopardize his warm water ports in the Crimea and bind Ukraine in a military pact with the West. He would like to eventually absorb Ukraine back into Russia in the event it becomes a failed state which is all too likely.

On the other hand Obama needs to make himself relevant on the world stage since it's impossible for him to make any progress whatsoever on his domestic agenda due to the intransigence of the Republican Congress. His freedom of operation and the area in which he can make a difference in the world is totally tied to his role as Commander in Chief. Therefore, of necessity he must concern himself mainly with those kinds of things. Maybe it's a little too cynical to suggest that his face off with Putin is a made for television clash between super heroes or a bid for a Cold War redux, but it seems a little high handed to chastise Putin for his operations in Ukraine when the US would never tolerate Mexico becoming a member of the Warsaw pact or any other alliance with Russia much less having missiles placed on its border.

Now that the situation in Iraq has once more become Obama's main concern, perhaps he will take a more relaxed stand in his propaganda war with Putin who after all is operating in the Ukraine much as Russian Czars have acted for hundreds of years. The Europeans' main concern is to continue business as usual with Russia with whom they do a considerable amount of trade. The US has no vital interest in Ukraine so why is it provoking a stand off with Putin who has vital interests there right in his back yard including a large number of ethnic Russians?

Frank Thomas is a graduate of Bowdoin and Dartmouth colleges. He was an independent management consultant and entrepreneur working with Dutch international shipbuilding and offshore oil/gas contracting firms for many years.

In recent years, he has been a trainer for such firms as ING, DSM, Siemens, the Dutch Ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Justice in The Hague and has been a teacher/lecturer at The Hague University and NTI University in Leiden, the Netherlands.